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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the pourover
authority of the Utah Supreme Court, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The Utah Supreme Court
poured this matter over to the Court of Appeals on October 19, 2001. The Utah Supreme Court
initially had jurisdiction of the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-3(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err by awarding Appellee Sue Ann Sheville ("Sheville") costs in
this matter although Sheville filed her memorandum for costs in the trial court more than one
month after the end of the five-day time frame mandated in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54?
This issue presents a question of law that the Court reviews for correctness, providing no
deference to the trial court. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000). Holman
preserved the issue in oral argument on Sheville's motion for attorneys' fees and costs; it also
involves "plain error" on the part of the trial court.
2. Did the trial court err by awarding Sheville costs that are clearly not recoverable
under Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Sheville's hotel bills, room
service charges, valet parking, and even hotel bills incurred by a third party, together with
photocopy fees, long-distance charges, and fees for sending facsimiles? This presents a mixed
issue of fact and law, reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard. Id. Holman preserved
the issue in her Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, R. at
298-309, and in oral argument on the motion.

1

3. Did the trial court err in concluding that Holman's objection to the appointment of
Sue Ann Sheville (hereinafter "Sheville") as guardian and conservator of Edwin L. Sheville
(hereinafter "Edwin") lacked merit? This is a question of law, which the Court reviews for
correctness, providing no deference to the trial court's decision. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Holman preserved the issue in her Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, R. at 298-309, and in oral argument on the motion.
4. Did the trial court err in determining that Holman acted in bad faith? A finding of
bad faith is a question of fact, reviewed by the Court under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
Id. Holman preserved the issue in her Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Attorney's
Fees and Costs, R. at 298-309, and in oral argument on the motion.
5. Did the trial court err in refusing to allocate attorneys' fees with regard to (i) the
portion of attorneys' fees that would have been incurred by Sheville regardless of Holman's
objection; (ii) the amount of attorneys' fees incurred because of the actions of Appellant
Grindstaff, Edwin's attorney; or (iii) the fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in the action?
This is a mixed question of fact and law, which the Court reviews under an "abuse of
discretion" standard. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). Holman preserved
the issue in her Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, R. at
298-309, and in oral argument on the motion.
6. Did the trial court err in entering a judgment for all attorney's fees and costs incurred
by Sheville against both Sandra Sheville Holman ("Holman") and David Grindstaff
("Grindstaff) jointly and severally? This is a question of law the Court reviews for
2

correctness, providing no deference to the trial court's decision. Salmon v. Davis County, 916
P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). Holman preserved the issue in the trial court in her Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, R. at 298-309, and in oral argument on the
motion.
IMPORTANT STATUTES AND RULES
The trial court relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) to award Sheville attorneys'
fees and costs. Section 78-27-56(1) provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense
to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." Id.
Rule 54(d) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a prevailing party to submit a
memorandum of costs and disbursements within five days of entry of the trial court's judgment
to recover costs.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 2000, Appellant Sandra Holman's ("Holman") father Edwin Sheville
("Edwin") traveled from his assisted living center in Brooklyn, New York, to Salt Lake City to
reunite with his daughter Holman. While in Salt Lake City, Edwin lived with Holman and his
granddaughter.
On October 19, 2000, Holman's half-sister Sue Ann Sheville ("Sheville") filed a
petition for emergency guardianship seeking guardianship over her father, Edwin. Holman
objected to the petition. Edwin also objected to Sheville's appointment as guardian. Indeed, he
opposed the appointment of any guardian. At the hearing on the emergency petition on October
3

25, 2000, David Grindstaff ("Grindstaff) appeared in Edwin's behalf and objected to the
petition.
On November 29, 2000, Holman filed a written objection to Sheville's petition for
permanent appointment as Edwin's guardian. Holman's decision to oppose Sheville's
appointment stemmed from her discussions with Edwin both during the time Edwin lived with
Holman and while Edwin lived in New York. During those discussions, Edwin indicated that
Sheville "dumped" him in a nursing home, rarely came to visit him, and took all his money and
refused to give him any spending money. Edwin repeatedly told Holman he wanted to come to
Salt Lake City to live with her.
On December 12, 2000, following several hearings, Judge Henriod granted Sheville's
petition and appointed her as Edwin's guardian. He also ordered that Edwin be returned to
New York and that any further proceedings concerning Edwin or his estate be in New York.
On January 30, 2001, Sheville filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Both
Holman and Grindstaff opposed Sheville's motion. The trial court heard oral argument on the
motion on May 21, 2001. On June 5, 2001, Judge Henriod issued a minute entry on the matter,
later incorporated into an Order dated July 2, 2001, granting Sheville's motion and entering
judgment against Holman and Grindstaff, jointly and severally, for all of Sheville's attorneys'
fees and costs. Holman filed her Notice of Appeal on July 31, 2001.1
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A Notice of Appeal was filed by David Grindstaff on July 31, 2001. R. at 346-347. Mr.
Grindstaff died on January 11, 2002. No probate of his estate has been filed as of the date of this
brief, and no brief was submitted by him.
4

On August 23, 2001, Sheville filed a Supplemental Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Costs, and amended that motion on August 28, 2001. On October 24, 2001, despite Holman's
objections to the trial court that an appeal was pending on Sheville's original motion for fees
and costs, the court granted the supplemental motion.
In all, the trial court awarded Sheville attorneys' fees and costs of $81,820.41 in the
initial and supplemental orders. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On October 2, 2000, Edwin left the care center where he resided in Brooklyn, New
York. His daughter, Sue Sheville, who also resided in Brooklyn, reported to the local police
that Edwin was missing. Hearing Transcript #22 at p. 28; R. at 324. The Brooklyn police
investigated and determined that Edwin left the care center and went to a subway station. Id.
2. Edwin traveled to Utah and contacted Holman. Holman initially provided him a
room first in her home. Subsequently, Holman arranged for Edwin to live with her daughter,
who had a larger home where Edwin could have his own room. R. at 312.
3. Sheville learned that Edwin was in Salt Lake City with Holman. She flew to Salt
Lake City and, in her own words, "confronted" Holman at her home. R. at 3. Holman stated
that Edwin was not there.

2

There are two transcripts of the hearings in this matter. The first is entitled, "Partial
Transcript of Hearing, November 21, 2000" and is designated herein as "Hearing Transcript #1."
The second is a larger volume entitled "Partial Transcript of Hearings November 21, 2000 and
December 12, 2000" and is designated herein as "Hearing Transcript #2."
5

4. Upon returning to New York, Sheville hired a private detective to locate Edwin. On
October 18, 2000, the detective observed Edwin and Holman together.3 In response, Sheville
filed a Petition for Emergency Appointment of Guardian. R. at 1. Sheville neither contacted
Edwin's attorney to ask specifically where Edwin was,4 nor did she seek the court's assistance
in ascertaining his whereabouts. Sheville merely relayed a message through her attorney to
Grindstaff that she wanted to talk to Edwin. R. at 46.
5. On or about October 19, 2000, Sheville returned to Salt Lake City and filed an ex
parte petition for emergency appointment as Edwin's guardian. R. at 1. The court granted the
emergency petition on October 19, 2000. R. at 11-12.
6. On October 25, 2000, the court conducted a hearing on the emergency petition. At
the hearing, Grindstaff appeared on Edwin's behalf and objected to the guardianship. Holman's
attorney also appeared and objected to the emergency petition. R. at 22.

3

The detective, Richard Romano ("Romano"), filed an "affidavit" comprising mostly
inadmissible conclusions. The admissible portion of the affidavit merely states that (i) he was
hired by Sue Sheville on October 10, 2000, to locate Edwin Sheville; (ii) he conducted an
investigation; and (iii) on October 18, 2000, he "observed and videotaped" Edwin in the
company of Holman at a private residence in Kearns, Utah. R. at 10. No foundation whatsoever
exists for the remainder of the affidavit, claiming Edwin was "in the care and custody" of
Holman or that Edwin had been "moved from location to location." Romano was not called as a
witness; accordingly neither Holman's counsel nor Grindstaff had the opportunity to examine
Romano regarding the affidavit or his observations. Romano merely stated he saw Edwin with
Holman on one occasion. Holman, however, readily testified she moved Edwin from her house
to her daughter's house so he could have his own room.
4

Sheville knew that Grindstaff represented Edwin. She testified that she and her attorney
had a conference call with Grindstaff on October 10, 2000, wherein Grindstaff stated that Edwin
had retained him. Hearing Transcript #2 at p. 44-45.
6

7. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court dissolved the temporary guardianship and
referred the matter to mediation. The court also confirmed the appointment of a court visitor,
Margy Campbell ("Campbell"), and a physician, Dr. Frederick Gottlieb ("Gottlieb"). Id.
8. On October 31, 2000, Holman took Edwin to his initial appointment with Campbell.
On November 2, 2000, Campbell was scheduled to have a home visit with Edwin; however,
Holman rescheduled the visit because Holman was making certain improvements to the home
and Edwin was going on a short vacation. Holman asked Campbell to reschedule the visit a
short time later. R. at 313.
9. Edwin's court-ordered medical examination was scheduled on November 10, 2000.
The night before the appointment, however, Edwin became very ill. Holman called Gottlieb
and informed him that Edwin was ill and that she was taking him to see a primary care
physician, Dr. Fuller, in the morning. As such, Edwin would be unable to keep his appointment
with Gottlieb. Dr. Fuller wrote a letter indicating Edwin was in his office that day and "should
be released from any activities that would have been done" on November 10, 2000. R. at 314,
322.
10. Sheville argued, in her November 10, 2000, motion that "no other appointment was
scheduled" with Gottlieb. However, Holman called Gottlieb's office on the afternoon of
November 9, 2000, and was forced to leave a message and had no opportunity to reschedule
with Gottlieb prior to Sheville's filing on November 10, 2000. Moreover, as Sheville knew,
Gottlieb's own records indicate Holman did reschedule for November 17, 2000. R. at 186-192.
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11. Sheville also argued that Gottlieb is a "very competent" physician. Holman does
not disagree; however, Gottlieb is a physician appointed by the court to assess Edwin's mental
status; Edwin's problem was severe nausea and vomiting. Thus, Holman determined the
problem was more in Dr. Fuller's area of expertise than Gottlieb's.
12. On November 10, 2000, Sheville noticed up a hearing on her petition for
appointment as guardian, and filed a Motion for Order Setting Deadline for Examination. In
her motion, Sheville accused Holman of "isolating" Edwin from the rest of his family and
"preventing] the examination by the court visitor and physician." R. at 28-49. The hearing on
the motion was set for November 15, 2000.
13. At the hearing on November 15, 2000, the probate judge ordered Edwin's
examination by the physician conducted at the earliest possible date, and the court visitor's
examination to be completed by November 25, 2000. R. at 50.
14. Before either could be done, however, Sheville filed a second petition for
emergency appointment as Edwin's temporary guardian. R. at 56-61.
15. On November 17, 2000, Sheville obtained an ex parte order appointing her as
Edwin's temporary guardian, together with a Writ of Assistance directed to the Salt Lake
County sheriff. The court issued the writ of assistance and made the temporary appointment of
guardian well before the time set forth by the probate court regarding the completion of
examinations by the court visitor and the physician. R. at 106-115, 186-192.
16. The examinations by the physician and court visitor were completed after Edwin
was placed in a local nursing home.
8

17. On November 29, 2000, Holman filed a written objection to Sheville's petition for
appointment as guardian. R. at 179-182. In the objection, Holman objected to the appointment
of a guardian, and stated that she had equal priority for appointment, that Edwin had been living
with her and receiving care from her, and that Edwin had expressed his desire to stay here in
Salt Lake City with her. Id.
18. On December 12, 2000, the trial court entered a permanent order appointing
Sheville as Edwin's guardian. The written order was entered on December 19, 2000, and letters
of guardianship were issued one week later. R. at 220-223.
19. On January 30, 2001, Sheville filed a motion seeking an award of attorney's fees
and costs, which was granted after briefing and argument. An Order was entered on July 2,
2001. In August, 2001, Sheville filed a supplemental motion seeking even more attorney's fees
and costs, which was granted. A second Order was entered on October 23, 2001. The total
amount of the two judgments entered jointly and severally against Holman and Grindstaff was
$81,820.41.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court committed plain error by awarding Sheville costs in this matter, because
Sheville failed to file her memorandum of costs and disbursements within the five-day period
after entry of judgment mandated by Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Sheville
did not file her memorandum until 41 days after the trial court had entered its order. Such an
error should have been apparent to the trial court. It was harmful to Holman because the award
of costs against Holman totaled more than $36,000.
9

Even if Sheville had timely filed her memorandum of costs, the trial court erred in
awarding Sheville expenses including hotel bills, room service charges, expenses to hire a
private investigator, valet parking charges, and expenses for long-distance, facsimiles, and
courier services. These expenses are not "costs" as contemplated in Rule 54(d) and the
applicable case law. The only costs recoverable by Sheville, had she timely submitted her
memorandum of costs, are service fees and filing fees totaling $148.
The trial court awarded Sheville costs and attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 7827-56. There is no provision in that statute for an award of costs. This, too, was plain error on
the part of the trial court since the trial court should have known § 78-27-56 allows only an
award of attorneys' fees, and since Holman was harmed because judgment for more than
$36,000 in "costs," together with more than $45,000 in fees, was awarded against her.
The trial court erred in concluding that Holman acted in "bad faith," as defined in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. First, Holman's objection to Sheville's petition for appointment as
guardian had bases in law and in fact and therefore did not lack merit. Second, there was
almost no evidence upon which the trial court could base its finding of bad faith. Such a
finding is against the clear weight of the evidence.
The trial court erred in refusing to reduce the more than $45,000 in attorneys' fees
awarded to Sheville and by entering judgment for the full amount of attorneys' fees and costs
against Holman and Grindstaff jointly and severally.
First, the attorneys' fees award should have been reduced by those fees reasonably
incurred by Sheville for the filing of the petition for appointment as guardian. There was no
10

appointment of guardian prior to Sheville's filing; she would have had to file such a petition in
any case after Edwin left the care center and traveled to Salt Lake City.
Second, the attorneys' fees should have been allocated between Grindstaff and Holman,
rather than awarded against both of them jointly and severally. Grindstaff died after filing his
Notice of Appeal and has not submitted a brief in this matter. As far as can be determined,
Grindstaff left no assets with which to satisfy any judgment against him. If his conduct
warranted a judgment for attorneys' fees and costs, fairness dictates responsibility for that
conduct lies with Grindstaff, not with Holman.
Third, the trial court awarded the entire amount of attorneys' fees and costs requested by
Sheville, without examining her request and making an independent determination as to the
award of fees, and the entering of appropriate findings of fact. Attorneys' fees awarded were
unreasonable and should have been reduced.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING SHEVILLE COSTS IN
THIS MATTER.

Sheville filed her Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements in this matter forty-one
days after the trial court's entry of judgment. Therefore, the trial court's order awarding
Sheville costs and fees violated Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
mandates that a verified memorandum of costs be filed within five days of entry of judgment.
Rule 54(d) states:
The party who claims costs must within five days after the entry
of judgment serve upon the adverse party . . . a copy of a
11

memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly erified stating to affiant's knowledge
the items are correct....
Id. (emphasis added). More importantly, the Rule 54(d) requirements, specifically the five day
time period, leave no discretion to the trial court in awarding costs after the expiration of the
five days. See Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, \16. Therefore, a trial court's decision to award
costs after the expiration of the five day time period is reviewed for correctness without
deference to the trial court's decision to award costs. See id.
In Lyon, the trial court issued its judgment on July 11,1995, and the plaintiffs did not
file a verified memorandum of costs with the trial court until July 26. See id. at \11. The trial
court denied the plaintiffs' requests for costs based, in part, on the plaintiffs' failure to timely
file their memorandum of costs. See id. at ^[75. In reviewing the trial court's ruling, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that the "mandatory language [of Rule 54] leaves no discretion to the
[trial] court; therefore, we review this decision for correctness without deference to the trial
court's conclusion." Id. (footnote omitted).
Initially, the court explained that "failure to satisfy the requirement for filing a verified
memorandum of costs is fatal to a claim to recover costs under Rule 54." The court therefore
concluded that the plaintiffs' "failure to file the verified memorandum of costs within five days
of the judgment prevents the award of costs." Id. at \11.
In the present matter, the trial court's Order appointing Sheville as Edwin's guardian
and denying Holman's objection to the appointment was entered in the Third Judicial District
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Court on December 19, 2000. Sheville did not file either an affidavit of attorneys' fees and
costs nor a memorandum of costs until January 30, 2001, 41 days after entry of the trial court's
Order. Therefore her failure to timely file her memorandum for costs is fatal to her claim to
recover those costs under Rule 54. See id. at 1J77. Accordingly, as set forth in Lyon, upon the
expiration of the five day window, the trial court had no discretion to award Sheville her costs
in this matter. Therefore, the trial court erred by awarding Sheville costs.
A. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error By Awarding Sheville Costs
The trial court had no discretion to award Sheville costs after five days had lapsed from
the entry of the court's judgment in this matter. See Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at \15\ Utah R. Civ. P.
54(d)(2). Holman's counsel did not specifically raise this argument in Holman's objection to
Sheville's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs; counsel did, however, raise this
argument during oral argument.
Nevertheless, this court may consider, under a plain error analysis, Holman's argument
that the trial court erred by awarding Sheville costs although she failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 54(d). To prevail under a plain error analysis, Holman must show that an
error occurred that "should have been apparent to the trial court, and the error must be
harmful." Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App 88,1(17, 978 P.2d
465.
In Classic Cabinets, this court reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees. See id.
In reaching this conclusion, this court determined the trial court's award was plain error and
harmful to the defendant. See id. at \\ 8. In Classic Cabinets, this court explained that neither
13

the plaintiff nor the trial court articulated a basis upon which to premise an award of fees. See
id. Further, "both the record and the law" failed to support the trial court's order awarding fees.
Id. This court concluded that "[bjecause this is a well-established rule, the trial court should
have been aware, even absent objection, that it was error to award the fees to [the plaintiff]" Id.
(emphasis added). Finally, in determining the harm prong of the analysis, this court determined
that the defendant was prejudiced "in the amount of one thousand dollars based on the trial
court's erroneous award." Id.
Similar to the rule regarding attorney fees discussed in Classic Cabinets, Rule 54(d)'s
requirement that a verified memorandum of costs be filed within five days of the trial court's
entry of judgment is equally, if not more so, well-established. In Lyon, the Utah Supreme
Court expressly stated that a party's failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 54 "is
fatal" to a claim to recover costs under the rule. Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at ^|77. Further, the
Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the trial court has no discretion to award a party
costs under Rule 54 if that party failed to file their verified memorandum of costs within five
days of the court's entry of judgment. See id.
In the present matter, Sheville did not even come close to complying with Rule 54(d).
Sheville filed her memorandum of costs 41 days after the trial court's judgment was entered.
Such a blatant failure to comply with the five day requirement set forth in Rule 54(d) should
have been patently obvious to the trial court. Indeed, reviewing and awarding costs is part and
parcel of the everyday routine of a trial judge, since costs are awarded "as of course" to the
prevailing party in litigation, under Rule 54(d). Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
14

Finally, the significant harm incurred by Holman as a result of the trial court's award of
costs is equally as obvious as the court's error in awarding those costs. Here, the trial court
awarded Sheville more than $36,000.00 in costs, which is nearly one-half the total judgment of
$81,820.41. The trial court's award is plainly harmful and plainly in error. Therefore, Holman
respectfully requests this court reverse the trial court's award of costs in this matter.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCESSIVE AWARD OF COSTS WARRANTS
REVERSAL BECAUSE IT FAILS TO COMPORT WITH UTAH LAW

Even if Sheville were entitled to costs under Rule 54(d), the trial court's award should
be reversed. The trial court awarded costs for lodging, long distance telephone calls, and
numerous other items outside the scope of the rule and Utah case law.
A. The costs awarded by the trial court are not contemplated by Rule 54(d)(1).
Assuming arguendo that Sheville had timely filed her Memorandum of Costs in this
matter, Utah law precludes Sheville from recovering those expenses that she asserts are "costs."
As the Utah Supreme Court indicated in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), costs
are generally narrowly defined. In Frampton, the court explained that "Rule 54(d)(1). . .
speaks of 'costs,' but does not further define that term. The generally accepted rule is that it
means those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and which the
statutes authorize to be included in the judgment." Id. at 774 (citations omitted). Further, the
court has expressly stated that "There is a distinction to be understood between the legitimate
'costs' and other 'expenses,' of litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not properly
taxable as costs. Id. Finally, while the trial court can "exercise reasonable discretion in regard
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to the allowance of costs; . . .[the trial court] has a duty to guard against any excesses or abuses
in the taxing thereof." Id. (citation omitted and emphasis added).
For example, in Frampton, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of costs
for expenses incurred in serving a subpoena, for a contour model, photographs, and certified
copies of documents. See id. In Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this
court reversed the trial court's award of $2,163.18 as "costs" for a survey conducted subsequent
to the commencement of the action. Id. at 1054. This court, relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Stratford v. Wood, 11 Utah 2d 251, 358 P.2d 80, 81 (1961), determined that the
survey may have been a necessary expenditure to assist the plaintiff in preparing his case;
however, such an expenditure "cannot be considered to be a 'cost.'" Id. This court concluded
the trial court "abused its discretion in awarding [the] plaintiff costs relating to the survey." Id.
In the present matter, the trial court awarded Sheville costs for photocopies, longdistance, hotel rooms (including room service and valet parking), airline tickets for Sheville and
her boyfriend, and numerous other unrecoverable costs, even including a hotel bill for a third
party not related to this case. See Affidavit of Sue Sheville, R. at 239-258.
None of the costs set forth in the affidavit are recoverable. They are not "fees which are
required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and which the statutes authorize to be included
in the judgment." Frampton, 605 P.2d 111,11 A.
Similarly, almost none of the costs set forth in the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and
Costs and the Amended Supplemental Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs are recoverable.
The initial affidavit filed by Sheville's counsel seeks $404.24 for costs. Of that amount,
16

$148.00 is recoverable under Rule 54(d): a $100 filing fee and a total of $48 ($43 plus $95
minus a $90 credit) in constable service fees.
In Sheville's Supplemental Motion, she seeks an additional $925.82 in costs. Again, the
only cost recoverable is $50 for a filing fee. The remainder are copying costs, fax charges, and
long distance telephone bills not recoverable under Rule 54(d).
Should this Court allow Sheville to recover any costs at all, that recovery should be
limited to "those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and which the
statutes authorize to be included in the judgment." Id.. The trial court's award of costs should
be reduced to $198 in recoverable costs.
B. Nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides for recovery of costs.
The trial court also erred in awarding Sheville her "costs" as part of its award of
attorney's fees for Holman's "bad faith" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Nothing in that
statute provides for an award of costs, but only for an award of attorneys' fees.
In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), a factually similar situation, the
prevailing party failed to file a memorandum of costs within the five day window afforded by
Rule 54(d). The prevailing party relied upon Utah's bad faith statute, § 78-27-56, to defend the
award of costs on appeal. The Supreme Court noted that § 78-27-56 refers "only to attorney
fees, with no mention of'costs' recoverable under the statute." 961 P.2d 305, 318. The
Supreme Court reversed the award, stating:
We do not interpret [the trial court's award of costs along with
fees] as an attempt to expand section 78-27-56 beyond its terms
to include 'costs." Rather, we take it to be a reference to the
17

generally understood meaning of "costs" . . . . However, under
rule 54(d)(2), costs are allowed only if the requisite memorandum
is filed within five days of the judgment. Because the Fitzgerald
parties did not file a verified memorandum of costs within five
days, the award of [costs] must be deleted from the judgment.
Id
As previously noted, in the present case, Sheville's memorandum of costs was not filed
until 41 days after the entry of the trial court's order. For the reasons articulated in Valcarce,
the award of costs to Sheville must be reversed.
POINT III:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING SHEVILLE MORE
THAN $81,000 IN ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-56

Simply no basis exists to support the trial court's conclusion that Holman's objection to
Sheville's appointment as Edwin's guardian was without merit and brought in bad faith.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in awarding Sheville more than $81,000 in attorney fees and
costs under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 2002). Section 78-27-56 is "narrowly drawn,"
and requires the trial court to conduct a two prong analysis "to safeguard against too broad an
application" before awarding attorney fees under the statute. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983). First, the trial court must determine that the action or defense to the action was
"without merit." Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2001 UT App 48,^[5, 21 P.3d
335. Second, the trial court must determine that the action or defense to the action was "not
brought or asserted in good faith." Id. This court reviews the trial court's determination under
the first prong of the analysis for "correctness," as this determination presents a question of law,
Id. This court reviews the second prong of the trial court's analysis under a "clearly erroneous
18

standard." Id. The trial court must find both elements to award attorney fees under the statute.
See id. As is explained more fully below, neither the facts in this matter nor the trial court's
order supports an award of attorney fees under Section 78-27-56.
A. The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That Holman's Objection To Sheville's
Appointment As Edwin's Guardian Was Without Merit
A review of Holman's objection to Sheville's Petition for Appointment of Guardian
plainly evinces that it did not lack merit because Holman had both a factual and legal basis to
oppose Sheville's appointment as Edwin's guardian. In Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court defined the phrase "without merit" contained in Section 78-2756 as referring to a "frivolous" claim or defense, meaning one with "little weight or importance
having no basis in law or fact." Id. at 151. As stated above, this court reviews the trial court's
determination that an action or defense was "without merit" for correctness, affording no
deference to the trial court's determination. See Wardley, 2001 UT App 49 at ^|5.
In Holman's objection to Sheville's petition for guardianship, Holman asserted three
reasons, each of which are grounded in fact and/or law, for opposing Sheville's petition and
asserting her desire to serve as Edwin's guardian. First, Holman states that she has an "equal
right to act as the Guardian for Edwin L. Sheville in the event a Guardian is required."
(Objection of Sandra Holman to Petition for Appointment of Guardian of an Incapacitated
Person, included in the Addendum hereto as A-l 1). Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-311 (2001)
expressly and unequivocally defines who may be a guardian and the priorities for appointment.
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that Edwin desired in "remain ir- ihe State of Utah and close to Sandra Holman." ( See
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and wniic in Utah, about the way Shev ille 1 i eate i 1 iin :i E
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hat everything had

been taken away from him and he was "dumped in the nursing home and he couldn't figure out
why he was there" (Id. at p. 67); that he was despondent and wanted to leave the nursing home
and come to Salt Lake City (R. at 299); that he wanted nothing whatsoever to do with Sheville
(R. at 299); that he did not want to see or be near Sheville (R. at 300); and that he told Holman
he slept with his clothes on so he could move fast if Sheville showed up. (Id.).
Moreover, Holman had a reasonable belief that Edwin was capable of making his own
decisions, and Holman took active steps to support that belief. Not only had Holman taken
Edwin to a physician for an evaluation, she also reviewed Edwin's medical records from June
1, 2000, which stated that Edwin only had "mild confusion" due to an intra cranial hemorrhage,
but had "been judged to be competent." R. at 319. Further, the court visitor testified that a lay
person such as Holman could be "fooled" by someone who had dementia, but presented as
having capacity. Indeed, the court visitor testified to the following regarding Edwin:
[He] presented very well. He was very - in the sense of being
very assertive about his belief that he did not need to have anyone
manage his affairs telling me he had been managing his financial
and emotional, his medical for the 78 years that he was living and
there wasn't any reason. So he's very assertive in that.
Hearing Transcript #2 at p. 11. Finally, the physician that evaluated Edwin, Dr. Gene R. Fuller,
M.D. stated in a letter dated October 9, 2000, that Edwin "need[s] a safe and positive
environment. He prefers to stay in Utah at the home of his daughter, Sandra Sheville
[Holman]." R. at 321.
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Edwin obtained an ex parte protective order against Sheville on October 23, 2000,
under Case N... < •*• --W06538CA The petition for protective order alleged that She\ ille
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clerk to provide assistance in filling out the forms for an ex parte protective order. Edwin
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and his signature notarized. The protective

order was signed by Judge Pai il Mai ighan, < v 1 10 added a pro^ ' isioi 11:1 lat i I : lie :>f Edwii i' s assets
were to be disposed of. It appears Judge Maughan met with Edwin, as is the usual practice of
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he sought, The ex parte protective order was served on She
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for hearing on November 9, 2000, before Domestic Relations Commissioner ! P iiru i Casey.
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()n December 12, 2000, Edwin testified that he "was asked by the officer of the c
sometime ago if I objected to a protective order. Vid I vi'.1 T A as a grown adult and 1 didn't
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know why I needed one

" 5 Hearing Transcript No. 2 at p. 90. The only other testimony

was Holman's: Edwin determined, on his own, to obtain the protective order. He repeatedly
told Holman he did not want to see Sheville or be near her. R. at 314.
There was simply no evidence upon which the trial court could find that Holman
obtained any protective order at all, let alone a "fraudulent" protective order. Under these
circumstances, it was error for the trial court to find Holman's objection to lack merit. This
Court should reverse the trial court's award of costs and fees against Holman.
B. The Trial Court Erred in Finding Holman Acted in Bad Faith.
The facts in this matter do not support the trial court's finding that Holman acted in bad
faith in opposing Sheville's petition for appointment as guardian. Indeed, as is evident from the
previous section, Holman had both a legal and factual basis to object to Sheville's appointment.
The existence of bad faith is a subjective question of state of mind. Canyon Country
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). To find that a party acted in bad faith
[T]he trial court must find that one or more of the following
factors existed: (1) the party lacked an honest belief in the
propriety of the activities in question; (2) the party intended to
take unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the party
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in
question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. In addition, the
bad faith finding must be supported by sufficient evidence that
one or more of these factors existed.
Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). A finding of
lack of good faith is a question of fact and is reviewed by the appellate court under the "clearly

5

It appears Edwin was confusing a protective order with an order of guardianship.
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Edwin's coming to Utah. Sheville alleges in her emergency petition that Edwin was
"removed" from the care center and "brought to Utah." First, Edwin traveled from New York
to Utah long before Sheville filed her petition for appointment as guardian. Obviously, at the
time he left the care center in New York and traveled to Utah, Edwin had no guardian and was
not under anyone's control. Accordingly, Sheville's unsupported allegation that Edwin was
"removed," and how Edwin got to Utah are irrelevant in that no guardianship proceedings were
pending. Therefore, assuming arguendo that Sheville alleges Holman "removed" Edwin, that
cannot be a basis for hindering or delaying a proceeding that has yet to start. Nevertheless, the
following evidence appears in the record on this issue:
About a month before he arrived in Utah, Edwin had asked Holman for money. She
sent him $200 cash. Just before she sent the money, Edwin and Holman had several
conversations about the fact that Sheville was selling Edwin's farm in Delaware. Edwin
expressed a desire to see an attorney about stopping the sale. R. at 312. Edwin had also
expressed a desire to come to Utah to live. R. at 311.
At the November 21, 2000, hearing in this matter, Holman had the following exchange
with Sheville's attorney regarding Edwin's transportation to Utah:
Q. Did you go to New York City and pick him up?
A. No.
Q. Did you arrange for him to be picked up?
A. No.
Q. Did you pay for his transportation? Help?
A. I did.
Q. Who did you pay?
A. I just sent the money to him.
Q. You sent the money to your father?
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Hearing Transcript # 2 at pp. 62-64.
f ioiman was later forced u- submit an aiVal.i. ''
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.*-o: :ie\ Horn examining her .•. JJ»; aptly ending the proceedings and
entering a permanent appointment of guardianship. In that affidavit, Holman testified as
follows:

[My father] told me that [Sheville] planned to sell his
home and farm in Delaware. He kept telling me the home and
farm was not for sale. He also told me that Sue gave him $5.00 a
week spending money, that she had taken all of his identification,
and that she seldom visited him. He asked me for money and
said he did not even have enough money to go see a lawyer.

I did send my father $200.00, which I thought he was
going to use to see an attorney regarding the sale of the Delaware
property.
R. at 311-312.
In sum, Holman sent her father $200 cash after he complained that he had no money,
and he wanted to see a lawyer, and that he wanted to come to Utah. Inasmuch as she had sent
the $200 only a couple of weeks prior to his arrival in Salt Lake City, Holman surmised during
her testimony at the hearing that he used the funds for his transportation. R. at 312; Hearing
Transcript #2 at 61-62. However, Holman also expressly testified that she did not know how
Edwin got to Utah.
Sheville also argued in her motions for fees that the court-appointed physician opined in
a written report that Edwin had been subjected to "elder abuse" because of the way he had been
"brought" to Utah. R. at 230. Gottlieb's statement, which he failed to expand upon because he
never testified before the trial court, is unsupported. Holman can only surmise that Gottlieb's
sole contact with anyone involved in this matter other than Edwin was with Sheville. Edwin
did not know how he got to Utah, and Sheville apparently did not tell Gottlieb about the New
York police's conclusion that Edwin left the care center and proceeded to a subway station.
Sheville only offered her self-serving statement that Holman must have been responsible for
Edwin leaving New York and coming to Utah.
Moreover, no evidence whatsoever exists as to how Edwin actually traveled to Salt
Lake, except Sheville's testimony that the New York police paperwork indicated Edwin had
gone from the care center to a subway station. R. at 8-9. Despite this fact, Sheville and her
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at Holman's home on November 2, 2000. Holman requested that Campbell's home visit be
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Sheville alleged, in net liiiuai petition IOI emergency appointment a> guaiuian, that
Edwin had an ankle injury and that she feared he was not getting appropriate nnvhV'il treatment
for that injury.
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rather to allow Holman time to complete the installation of a handrail and other improvements
to the home for Edwin's benefit. R. at 313. Additionally, Edwin had gone on a short trip with
Holman's husband. Therefore, the home visit was rescheduled for November 27, 2000.
Hearing Transcript #2 at p. 15.
Holman was also forced to reschedule the appointment with Gottlieb because Edwin
was ill. Edwin's appointment with Gottlieb was originally scheduled for November 10.
However, on November 9 Holman called Gottlieb and informed him that Edwin was ill, and
that she was taking him to see Dr. Fuller on November 10. Dr. Fuller confirmed this in a letter
stating that Edwin was in his office on November 10 and "should be released from any
activities that would have been done." R. at 314, 322. Holman rescheduled the appointment
with Gottlieb for approximately November 17, 2000. R. at 186.
Accordingly, the trial court completely ignored the fact that Holman rescheduled both
appointments and that valid reasons existed for the rescheduling. Instead, Holman surmises
that the trial court relied on Sheville's counsel's argument implying some sort of conspiracy
between Holman and Dr. Fuller, rather than relying on the only evidence concerning the reason
for the rescheduling - Holman's affidavit and Dr. Fuller's letter.
Sheville's counsel somehow parlayed the delay in scheduling into a "scheme" by
Holman to hinder and delay Sheville's appointment as guardian. Such a leap is illogical,
because the facts in this matter plainly evince that Holman had no intent to hinder or delay. In
fact, a brief summary of the chronology of this matter demonstrates that no delay occurred.
The probate court appointed the court visitor and physician on October 25, 2000. R. at 22. The
first appointment with the court visitor occurred on October 31, 2000, and the original
appointment with the physician was scheduled for November 10, 2000. On November 15,
2000, the probate ordered the court visitor to complete her work by November 25, and the
physician's visit (which would have been completed on November 17, 2000, as scheduled by
29
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Judge Rigtrup testified that during one sueh meeting, Holman's counsel had made a p^po<ai
and Lidwin's lawyer "could not 'find Mr. Shevii -
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The only testimony on this point came from Holman 9 . Holman testified that after
several hours, Edwir
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Fdwin told Holma.. iie was going to go io ine bathroom. When Edwir. aid not return, Holman

'Gottleib's report is undated. However, there is one notation that states the cognitive
examination was performed at his office on "October 24, 2000." This is obviously an error,
since Gottleib was not appointed until October 25, 2000. Apparently the correct date was
November 24, 2000. Gottleib notes that an appointment scheduled one week prior by another
family member (Holman) had been cancelled. R. at 186-192.
^Despite explicit uneeuon nuni the court, Sheville's counsel continued to ask questions
of Judge Rigtrup at the November 15, 2000 hearing, as to what had occurred during the
mediation. The court sustained several objections on this point. However, in her memorandum,
Sheville included several claims about what Edwin had or had not said in mediation. Any such
statements, even if true, are inadmissible settlement negotiations. Rule 40(8, Utah Rules of
Evidence.
9

Holman's daughter, Renae Christensen, also testified, and In i Icsfimoin umeermnjj w \\\
the mediation ended was the same as Holman's.

and her daughter searched for him. Edwin had become very ill; they located him downstairs
from where the mediation was taking place, at a bank, vomiting in a trash can. Because Edwin
and Holman had been left sitting by themselves for some time, Holman believed the mediation
was over. Accordingly, Holman took Edwin home to rest because he was so ill. R. at 313.
4. Edwin's marriage. The facts in this matter do not support Sheville's allegation that
Edwin's marriage "could not have been carried out without Sandra Holman's involvement and
undue influence." At a hearing before the probate judge on November 15, 2000, David
Grindstaff, Edwin's counsel, told Sheville that Edwin had recently married Betty Quigley.
Subsequently, Sheville alleged in her emergency petition that Edwin's marriage "could not
have been carried out without Sandra Holman's involvement and undue influence."
However, no evidence in the record evinces Holman's "involvement" or undue
influence in facilitating Edwin's marriage to Quigley. Holman simply introduced Edwin to
Quigley. Hearing Transcript #2 at p. 69. However, she also introduced him to her friends and
neighbors that might be his age. Id. Holman believed, based upon the significant amount of
time the two spent together after his arrival in Utah, that Edwin was happier when he was able
to get out and be with other people. Id. at pp. 69-70. Finally, David Grindstaff prepared (and
notarized) a prenuptial agreement for Edwin. R. at 237-238. No other evidence on this issue
exists in the record, necessarily leading to the conclusion that Holman had virtually no
involvement in Edwin's marriage. No evidence whatsoever exists to support the conclusion
that Holman unduly influenced Edwin to marry Quigley.
5. Perjury. Finally, the trial court determined that Holman committed perjury.
However, neither the trial court's minute entry nor the order states exactly what facts or
evidence the trial court relied upon in reaching its determination. In fact, there is little in
Holman's testimony that was material to the issues before the trial court. Holman testified that
she had mailed Edwin $200 cash; that she could not and would not have "met him halfway;"
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"successful claims for which there may be an entitlement for attorney's fees, (ii) unsuccessful
claims for which there would have been an entitlement for attorney's fees had the claims been
successful, and (iii) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney's fees. " Id. (citations
omitted and emphasis added). Second, the claims must be categorized according to the various
opposing parties. See id.
When the party seeking fees has satisfied these requirements, the trial court must then
"make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of the
parties' evidentiary hearing." Id. Further, the supreme court has explained that
The trial court should also document its evaluation of the
requested fees' reasonableness through findings of fact. These
findings should mirror the requesting party's allocation of fees
per claims and parties and should support any award issued.
They enable the reviewing court to make an independent review
of the fee award and whether the findings are sufficient to support
the award is a question of law reviewed for correctness. The
findings of fact, furthermore, should detail the factors considered
dispositive by the trial court in calculating the award.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Foote, the plaintiffs requested attorney fees at trial, submitting an affidavit by their
counsel in support. See id. The plaintiffs' counsel testified at trial concerning the fees he
charged plaintiffs for work on their case. See id. The plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit failed to
categorize the fee request according to the plaintiffs' successful and unsuccessful claims and
the opposing parties involved in the action. See id. The trial court relied "totally" on the
plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit and counsel's supporting trial testimony and ordered the
defendants to pay the entire amount of fees requested. See Id.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award. See id. at 57. The
court explained that "[e]ven a cursory look at counsel's affidavit reveals counsel's failure to
properly categorize the reasonableness of the fees related to the breach of contract claim." Id. at
55. Further, the court explained that "[n]othing in the record indicates that the trial court
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1. Filing of the original Petition for Emergency Appointment as Guardian: Between
October 17 and October 25, 2000, Sheville's attorneys billed the total amount of $5,021.25 in
connection with the original Petition for Emergency Appointment as Guardian. Items billed
included drafting the original emergency petition, letter and order appointing the court visitor,
meeting with Sheville and others prior to filing the petition, and preparation for and attendance
at the October 25, 2000, hearing.
Sheville is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees in connection with her original
emergency petition, because she would have incurred these attorneys' fees in any event. All the
evidence indicates that Edwin came here of his own accord, on a date prior to the appointment
of any guardian. Sheville had to travel to Utah and file her petition for appointment as Edwin's
guardian in order to obtain the authority to forcibly return Edwin to New York. Nothing
Holman did or could have done had any effect on Sheville's filing of the original petition for
emergency appointment.
2. Filing of the Petition for (Permanent) Appointment as Guardian: Similarly, nothing
Holman did or could have done had any effect on the preparation and filing of Sheville's
petition seeking permanent appointment as Edwin's Guardian, nor on the requirement that
Sheville establish the need for a permanent appointment of guardian. On October 23 and
October 26-27, Sheville's attorney billed $1,237 for drafting the petition for full guardianship,
letters of guardianship, and associated documents, and for conferences with the court visitor
and others concerning the permanent guardianship.
3. Defending the Protective Order Obtained by Edwin: A review of the record
exonerates Holman from any involvement in the protective order Edwin obtained. However,
Sheville was awarded $2,207 for attorney fees billed from November 6 through November 9,
2000, which was directly related to the protective order.
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4. Annulment of Marriage. There is nothing that entitles Sheville to an award of
attorney fees related to the annulment of Edwin's marriage to Quigley. Grindstaff drafted and
notarized a prenuptial agreement in connection with that marriage, but the only involvement
Holman had was to introduce Edwin to Quigley. The trial court erroneously awarded
approximately $2,466.5010 in connection with the annulment of the marriage.
B. Sheville's fee request failed to categorize her claims according to the various
opposing parties.
Sheville's fee request wholly lacks any categorization of the claims relating to the
various opposing parties, namely Holman and Edwin's counsel, Grindstaff. Regarding a
request for fees, the supreme court has expressly stated that "claims must.. .be categorized
according to the various opposing parties." Id at 55.
In the present matter, both Holman and Edwin opposed Sheville's appointment as
Edwin's guardian. As such, both Holman and Grindstaff are considered opposing parties.
Interestingly, the trial court suggests that Grindstaff, rather than his client, Edwin, is an
opposing party by holding Grindstaff jointly and severally liable for Sheville's attorney's fees.
Nevertheless, a review of Sheville's fee request and the record in this matter clearly evinces that
Sheville failed to categorize her claims according to both Holman and Grindstaff.
Specifically, Grindstaff prepared and drafted all documents relating to Edwin's marriage
to Quigley, of which Holman or her attorney, had no part. Sheville's fee request, and her
counsel's affidavit, submit numerous charges amounting to more than $2,400.00, to annul
Edwin's marriage to Quigley. However, neither the fee request nor the affidavit identify the
party to which the fees relating to the annulment should be attributed. Moreover, the trial court
10

The precise amount is difficult to ascertain because Sheville's counsel did not separate
its fee billing entries according to claim. For example, the entry dated 01/12/01 indicates Mr.
Alderman billed one hour for "Work on annulment and petitio for fees and costs." R. at 356.
Where such mixed entries appear, one-half the total time billed was attributed to the annulment.
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found in its initial minute entry that "attorney David Grindstaff failed to ascertain relevant facts
and failed to investigate Mr. Sheville's competency. Consequently . . . Grindstaff clearly acted
contrary to his client's best interests .. .." R. at 338-339.
Between October 20, 2000, and November 20, 2000, Sheville's attorney billed more
than $17,000. A portion of that amount is attributable to Grindstaff s actions. Again, Sheville
made no effort to categorize the fees attributable to Grindstaff s actions rather than Holman's.
Time spent by Sheville's attorney dealing with Grindstaff is billed together with time spent on
other issues and cannot be separately categorized except by Sheville's own counsel.
C. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to include findings of fact in its
order awarding Sheville fees.
The trial court's order awarding Sheville attorney fees fails to include any findings of
fact documenting its independent evaluation of the reasonableness of Sheville's requested fees.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that in awarding fees, the trial court should (1) conduct an
independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees, (2) document its evaluation
of the requested fees' reasonableness through findings of fact, and (3) in its findings of fact,
detail the factors it considers dispositive in calculating the award. See id. As previously stated,
the trial court's findings of fact "should mirror the requesting parties' allocation of fees for
claims and parties and should support any award issued." Id. By doing so, the trial court
enables this court to independently review the fee award and to determine whether the findings
are sufficient to support the award. See id.
Here, the trial court made no findings of fact. "Nothing in the record indicates that the
trial court performed an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees." Id.
at 56. Because the trial court failed to enter any findings of fact, the record is devoid of the
information used in its evaluation of Sheville's fee award or the factors the trial court relied
upon to support that award. The record is devoid of any factors the trial court considered
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dispositive in calculating Sheville's fee award. Finally, the trial court's failure to enter any
findings fails to meet the Supreme Court's strong suggestion that the findings mirror the
requesting party's allocations of claims and parties to support the award issue. See id.
In all, the record in this matter indicates that the trial court awarded in "wholesale" all
Sheville's requested attorney fees although those fees had not been allocated as to separate
claims and/or parties. See id at 57. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by "rubber
stamping]" Sheville's fee request apparently without separately conducting a meaningful
evaluation of the amount requested. Id. Holman therefore requests this court reverse the trial
court's award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
The facts and the record in this matter plainly support this Court reversing the trial
court's award of costs and attorney's fees. First, the trial court had no discretion to award
Sheville costs under Rule 54(d) because her memorandum of costs was untimely. Rule 54(d)
required that Sheville file her memorandum of costs within five days of the trial court's entry of
judgment. Sheville filed her memorandum of costs 41 days after the trial court's entry of
judgment. Accordingly, the trial court plainly erred by awarding Sheville costs, and therefore
this Court should reverse the trial court's award of costs.
Second, the trial court plainly erred by awarding Sheville costs that were clearly outside
the scope of costs allowed under Utah law. A review of the "costs" the trial court awarded
included but were not limited to, Sheville's expenses for hotel accommodation, room service
bills, valet parking, hotel accommodation for a third party (not a party to this matter), and long
distance telephone bills. Utah law clearly follows the general rule that those expenses which
are required to be paid to the Court and to witnesses, and which the statutes authorize, are
properly categorized as "costs." Further, Utah law imposes a duty upon the trial court to guard
against any excesses or abuses regarding costs. Simply put, those costs awarded by the trial
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court in this matter do not comport with Utah law. Moreover, the trial court failed in its duty to
guard against abuses and excesses in awarding Sheville the costs she sought. Accordingly, this
court should reverse the trial court's award of costs to Sheville.
Third, the trial court erred both as a matter of law and by abusing its discretion in
awarding Sheville attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The facts of this matter
demonstrate that Holman had both a legal and factual basis for opposing Sheville's
appointment as Edwin's guardian. Accordingly, the trial court's erred as a matter of law when
it determined, in light of the evidence before it, that Holman's objection was without merit.
Further, as Holman's marshaling of the evidence demonstrates, the trial court's
determination that Holman acted in bad faith is unsupportable and clearly erroneous. Quite
simply, the facts in this matter do not support such a conclusion. Therefore, this court should
reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees in this matter because Holman's objection was
both meritorious and pursued in good faith.
Finally, the trial court plainly erred by awarding to Sheville attorney fees because her
request did not properly allocate the claims in which she was not entitled to recover fees and
failed to categorize her claims among opposing parties.
Further compounding the trial court's error was its failure to enter any findings of fact
evincing (1) that the trial court conducted an independent investigation into the reasonableness
of Sheville's fee request, and (2) the factors which the trial court considered dispositive in
calculating Sheville's award.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees as the trial
court has abused its discretion by awarding wholesale all fees Sheville requested although they
were not allocated as to separate claims or parties.
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For the foregoing reasons, Holman respectfully requests this Court reverse the trial
court's order awarding Sheville fees and costs. Holman also requests her fees and costs
incurred in bringing this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of July, 2002.

HANKS, ROOKER AND DENNING, P.C.

,4fl*7iSSlS*^''

,ameron S. Denning
Attorney for Sandra Sheville Holman
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ADDENDA
Minute Entry, June 5, 2001 [R. 338-340]
Order, July 2, 2001 [R. 342-343]
Supplemental Motion for Attorneys Fees, October 4, 2001 [R.403-404]
Order on Amended Supplemental Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, October 23, 2001 [R
407-409]
Objection of Sandra Holman to Petition for Appointment of Guardian of an Incapacitated
Person, November 29,2000 [R. 179-182]
Utah Code Section 78-27-5678-27-56
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

IN THE MATTER OF:
EDWIN L.SHEVILLE,
a protected person.

MINUTE ENTRY
CASENO.003901478
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

Ms. Sheville's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs came before the above entitled Court
on May 21,2001. Having fully considered the arguments of counsel, the submissions of the parties
and applicable legal authority, the Court now enters the following decision.
Under UCA § 78-27-56, "in civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action.. . was without merit and not brought
. . . in good faith." Accordingly, this Court makes the following findings and conclusions.
1. The Court finds that Ms. Holman's actions in this case were without merit. Holman knew
or should have known that Mr. Sheville was incapacitated and Holman's objections to the
guardianship proceedings and pursuit of a fraudulent protective order were frivolous.
2. The Court finds that Ms. Holman lacked an honest belief in the propriety of her actions
and undertook activities, including perjury, which improperly hindered and delayed Ms.
Sheville's appointment as guardian.
3. The Court finds that attorney David Grindstaff failed to ascertain relevant facts and failed
to investigate Mr. Sheville's competency. Consequently, because Grindstaff clearly acted
contrary to his client's best interests, he, along with Ms. Holman, shall be jointly and
A-1

severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs.
3. The Court furtherfindsthat attorney fees in the amount of $ 61,780.66 are reasonable and
proper. The amount of $35,364.92 compensates Sheville for the expenses she incurred in
defending against Holman's bad faith claim, and the amount of $26,415.74 compensates
attorney Kent B. Alderman. The Court concludes that the basis for these amounts is properly
documented and delineated in the parties respective affidavits.
Mr. Alderman shall prepare an Order consistent with this Minute Entry.

£

Dated this _ 2 _ day of June, 2001.

BY THE COURT:

STEPHEN L. HEflRtOtb-"
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 003901478 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

day of

NAME
KENT B. ALDERMAN
ATTORNEY PET
2 01 SOUTH MAIN STREET #1800
P.O. BOX 45898
SLC, UT 84145-0898
CAMERON S. DENNING
ATTORNEY
8 EAST BROADWAY
SUITE 74 0
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
DAVID GRINDSTAFF
ATTORNEY
5505 S 900 East
Suite 325
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84117
20

^^t/_

Deputy,
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KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034)
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Guardian
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

ENTERED IN REGISTRY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF:
EDWIN L. SHEVILLE,

ORDER
Probate No.

003901478

Judge Stephen L. Henriod
a protected person.

On May 21, 2001, the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and supporting memoranda from
Sue Ann Sheville ("Ms. Sheville"), and responsive memoranda from Sandra Holman ("Ms. Holman")
and David Grindstaff ("Mr. Grindstaff), respectively, came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod. Kent B. Alderman and Sean D. Reyes appeared on behalf of Ms.
Sheville, Cameron S. Denning appeared on behalf of Ms.

Holman, and David Grindstaff appeared on

behalf of himself.
On June 5, 2001, the Court, having considered the written memoranda, affidavits and other
materials submitted by the parties, having reviewed the applicable legal authorities, having heard the
oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, entered a Minute Entry ("Minute

i HIM urn mi inn mil iliiin mil mil mi mi A ~4
ii in mil mil mil i niii mi ^
Order @J

4H515.1

Entry") granting Ms. Sheville's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs against Ms. Holman and Mr.
Grindstaff, jointly and severally. Now, for the reasons set forth in said Minute Entry, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1.

For the reasons set forth in the Court's Minute Entry, the Court finds that Ms. Holman's

actions in the above-captioned case were without merit and not brought in good faith.
2.

For the reasons set forth in the Court's Minute Entry, the Court also finds that Mr.

Grindstaff acted contrary to his client's best interests in the above-captioned case.
3.

Consequently, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's Minute Entry, Ms. Holman and

Mr. Grindstaff are jointly and severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs
incurred as a result of the actions of Ms. Holman and Mr. Grindstaff in the above-captioned case.
4.

As set forth in the Court's Minute Entry, the reasonable and proper amount of Ms.

Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result of the actions of Ms. Holman and Mr. Grindstaff
in the above-captioned case equals $61,780.66.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this ^ d a y ofJUB$ 2001.

BY THE COURT:

2
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES
GUARDIANSHIP OF EDWIN L
Case No: 003901478
SHEVILLE
Judge: STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
Date: 10/04/2001

Clerk: matellew
The guardian's Amended Supplemental Motion Eor Attorney's Fees is
granted. Counsel for the guardian is directed to prepare an order
consistent with this minute entry and ensure that the order be
included in the record in order that the Court of Appeals consider
the entire amount of attorney fees awarded as part of Sandra
Sheville Holman's appeal of the July 5, 2 00L Order of this Court.

Paap 1
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Case No: 003901478
Date:
Oct 04, 2001
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 003901478 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

3-

NAME
KENT B. ALDERMAN
ATTORNEY PET
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET #1800
P.O. BOX 45898
SLC, UT 84145-0898
CAMERON S. DENNING
ATTORNEY
8 EAST BROADWAY
SUITE 74 0
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
DAVID GRINDSTAFF
ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 571453
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84157-1453

day of

20^/_

Taqe 2 Q a s H

IMAGED
Third Judicial District

KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034)
SEAN D.REYES (7969)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Guardian
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF:
EDWIN L. SHEVILLE,

ORDER ON AMENDED
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
Probate No. 003901478

a protected person.
Judge Stephen L. Henriod
On July 5, 2001 this Court issued an Order (the "Initial Order") granting the Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs (the "Initial Motion") filed by Guardian Sue Ann Sheville (the "Guardian")
against Sandra Holman ("Holman") and David Grindstaff ("Grindstaff'). The Initial Order was based
on the findings of this Court, as recorded in its Minute Entry of June 5, 2001 (the "Initial Minute
Entry").
Subsequently, the Guardian filed an Amended Supplemental Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Costs and supporting memoranda (the "Supplemental Motion") against Holman and Grindstaff. Holman
filed a responsive memorandum. No responsive memorandum was filed by Grindstaff. A Notice to

A-8
430976.1

UK-1

Submit for Decision the Supplemental Motion was filed by the Guardian on September 18, 2001. No
hearing was set on the matter.
On October 4, 2001, the Court, having considered the written memoranda, affidavits and other
materials submitted by the parties regarding the Supplemental and Initial Motions, having reviewed the
applicable legal authorities, and being fully advised in the premises, entered a Minute Entry granting the
Guardian's Supplemental Motion against Holman and Grindstaff (the "Supplemental Minute Entry").
Now, for the reasons set forth in the Initial and Supplemental Minute Entries, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1.

Holman's actions in this case were without merit and not brought in good faith.

2.

Grindstaff acted contrary to his client's best interests in this case.

3.

Holman and Grindstaff are jointly and severally liable for payment of the Guardian's

attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result of their actions in this case.
4.

The reasonable and proper amount of the Guardian's attorneys' fees and costs incurred as

a result of the actions of Holman and Grindstaff in this case equals the initial amount ordered on June 5,
2001, of $61,780.66, plus the supplemental amount hereby ordered of $20,039.75, for a total judgment
in the amount of $81,820.41.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this &_ day of October, 2001.

430976 !

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this / f f i a a y of October, 2001., I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS, by United States mail, postage pre-paid, to the following counsel of record:

Cameron Denning

HANKS, ROOKER & DENNING
The Judge Building, Suite 740
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David L. Grindstaff
5505 South 900 East #325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MATTHEW N.OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 4239
OLSEN & OLSEN, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Sandra Holman
8142 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176

NOV 2 9 2000
SALT LAKE COUNTY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF:

:
:
:

EDWIN L. SHEVILLE,

OBJECTION OF SANDRA HOLMAN TO
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
GUARDIAN OF AN INCAPACITATED
PERSON

an incapacitated person.

Probate No. 0*31 >tt*fb
Judge

COMES NOW Sandra Holman, and hereby objects to the Petition of Sue Ann
Sheville for the Appointment of Guardian of Incapacitated Person, based upon the following:
1.

That Sandra Holman objects to paragraphs 1 through 13 of the Petition of Sue

Ann Sheville.
2.

That Sandra Holman has an equal right to act as the Guardian for Edwin L.

Sheville in the event a Guardian is required.
3.

That Sandra Holman is capable of caring for and has cared for Edwin L.

Sheville in the past.

1
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4.

That Edwin L. Sheville has expressed his desire to Sandra Holman to remain in

the State of Utah and close to Sandra Holman.
WHEREFORE, Sandra Holman requests that the Petition of Sue Ann Sheville be
denied or, in the alternative, in the event the appointment of a Guardian is required, that Sandra
Holman be appointed as the Guardian of Edwin L. Sheville.
DATED this 2**" day of November, 2000.
OLSEN & OLSEN, L.L.C.

By:

°

^

^

MATT\HEWN. OLSEN
Attorney for Sandra Holman
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SANDRA HOLMAN, beingfirstduly sworn, deposes and says: that she is the
daughter of EDWIN L. SHEVILLE, that she has read the foregoing OBJECTION OF
SANDRA HOLMAN TO PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN OF AN
INCAPACITATED PERSON, knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true to the
best of her knowledge and belief.

SANDRA HOLMAN

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ^ 8

r ! S S J T "" """Notary Pubto"" T
I^SMS^
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NOTARY^UBLIC
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day of November, 2000.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of November, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing OBJECTION OF SANDRA HOLMAN TO PETITION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN OF AN INCAPACITATED PERSON, postage prepaid
thereon, to the following:
Kent B. Alderman, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
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Utah Code Section 78-27-5678-27-56. Attorney's fees - Award where action or
defense in bad faith - Exceptions. (1) In civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that
the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against
a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under
the provisions of Subsection (1).
Amended by Chapter 92, 1988 General Session
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the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action,
other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review,
shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of
Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by
law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in
the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified
stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A
party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service
of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the
court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3) [Deleted.]
(4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in
any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time
it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The
clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in
any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a
blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof
in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and
any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind
from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for
judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or
its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the 31st day of July, 2002,1 caused two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to each of the following:
Kent B. Alderman
Sean D. Reyes
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
David Grindstaff (Deceased)
P.O. Box 571453
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157
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